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Business dynamics, i.e. business start-up, failure and growth processes, affect price levels, 
output and employment and determine efficiency in the allocation of productive resources 
among sectors and firms. A low business start-up rate usually denotes there are idle productive 
resources which do not find a suitable use in the productive process. Further, an excessively 
low business failure rate may also indicate that resources are employed inefficiently in low-
growth-potential sectors and firms. The fact that corporations encounter limits to their size is 
also a symptom of an inefficient allocation of factors of production insofar as they are not 
geared towards those sectors and companies with a greater value-generation capacity.
This chapter documents firstly certain basic features of business demography in Spain. In 
particular, the evidence available shows that business start-ups and failures are not 
abnormally low compared with other European countries. Nevertheless, the poorer outlook 
for business profitability and the tightening of financial conditions as a result of the crisis 
have seemingly caused business start-ups to remain at relatively low levels in recent years. 
Moreover, there are differences in the characteristics of newly created Spanish firms in 
respect of their size, initial productivity levels and survival rate which seem to be lower than 
those of other developed economies. 
This chapter presents evidence suggesting that companies which obtain productivity gains 
usually increase their size levels despite distortions of varying kinds (regulatory, economic, 
financial, etc.) which limit the growth of their employment levels. As a consequence, 
Spain’s business sector is characterised by a relatively high number of small companies 
with low productivity, irrespective of size.
Secondly, the chapter examines in depth the different financial and regulatory conditioning 
factors which affect the characterisation of Spanish business demography. From the 
different pieces of information analysed, it can be concluded that the possible removal of 
barriers and friction in these areas would generate positive macroeconomic effects, but 
this in itself does not ensure that there will be sustained economic growth. The latter 
requires, furthermore, the application of various levers with the potential to directly increase 
business productivity through improvements in the quality and use of production factors as 
well as in the functioning of markets and institutions.
In recent years much of the debate about economic policy has focused on whether it was 
appropriate to undertake structural reforms. Notwithstanding considerable discussion 
about policies conducive to greater labour market flexibility, the proper functioning of the 
product markets is also key to facilitating macroeconomic adjustment in the face of 
economic shocks, to increasing efficiency and, in short, to encouraging higher growth. In 
fact, there are sound reasons to think that as part of an optimum strategy to improve the 
economy’s structural fundamentals, the regulatory reform of the product market should go 
hand in hand with and even – in certain circumstances – precede labour market flexibility1.
In the short term, the behaviour of prices and wages due to changing economic conditions 
determines the speed and scale of the macroeconomic adjustment. For example, the 
1  Introduction
The functioning of product 
markets is a determining 
factor of an economy’s 
macroeconomic 
performance...
...both in the short and long 
term
1  O.Blanchard and F. Giavazzi (2003), «Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor 
Markets», Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118.
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higher the nominal inertia, the greater the decreases in an economy’s production and 
employment following a negative economic shock. The duration and costs of internal 
devaluation, such as that undertaken by the Spanish economy during the crisis in order to 
restore competitiveness, also hinges crucially on the nominal rigidity of prices and wages. 
Greater competition in product markets boosts price and wage flexibility, heightens the 
impact of the adjustment of the latter on the real exchange rate and, consequently, 
improves competitiveness (see Chapter 2 of this Report).2
The structure of the market in which companies operate is even more significant in the 
long term. Competition in product markets is directly linked to the incentives for 
corporations to generate and adopt technological innovation, and it also conditions the 
allocation of productive resources among the different sectors and firms with varying 
productivity levels. The channel for incentives for innovation and that for promoting factor 
reallocation both have implications for productivity growth. This consideration is especially 
important in the case of the Spanish economy, since certain shortcomings in the functioning 
of the product and labour markets have been detected recurrently. These shortcomings 
delay innovation and the adoption of new technologies by hindering the efficient allocation 
of productive resources and, in short, by reducing productivity growth.
The limitations on the proper functioning of the product market and their implications for 
the efficient allocation of resources are usually reflected in the dynamics of the business 
sector. Consequently, the diagnosis and analysis of the determinants of business start-up, 
failure and growth rates provide useful information when designing and applying structural 
reforms aimed at improving the economy’s growth potential.
Business start-up and failure rates depend not only on the outlook for and expectations 
about demand but on aspects such as the start-up costs of the business activity or those 
costs arising from the so-called «second-chance» asset liquidation, business restructuring 
and reorganisation arrangements. Both types of costs may, moreover, bias business 
investment towards those assets and sectors where the guarantees offered in contracts 
and the liquidation of assets in the event of insolvency are less costly to enforce, leading 
on occasions to an inefficient allocation of resources.3
Likewise, there are frictions that affect the adjustment of firm size and condition their 
growth. Some regulatory “thresholds” operate by discouraging the growth of the most 
productive firms beyond a certain size. For instance certain fiscal regulations, relating to 
administrative controls derived from audit requirements, or labour regulations, linked to 
the firm’s staff representation requirements and employee rights, which under Spanish 
legislation are subject to stricter regulations once employment numbers have reached 
certain levels, give rise to these types of thresholds. Other frictions add distortions to the 
relative prices of the factors of production, entailing certain competitive advantages for 
some firms that are not necessarily the most productive ones. Of note here are certain 
labour market, financial, sectoral and government procurement accessibility regulations.
Business start-ups and their entry to new markets also call for the availability of financing 
providing for the launch of new investment projects and the maintenance thereof until they 
prove profitable. In this respect, the availability of personal wealth, the functioning of the 
Business dynamics, influenced 
by the functioning of the 
product market, are an essential 
mechanism for improving 
efficiency and productivity
The costs of starting and 
winding up a business activity 
determine not only the pace of 
business start-ups and 
failures, but the type of firms 
being created and failing...
...and different regulatory 
distortions may limit the 
growth of the most productive 
firms
Financial conditions 
fundamentally influence 
business dynamics
2  See J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural reforms in a debt overhang, Working Paper No. 1421, 
Banco de España.
3  See Ó. Arce, J. M. Campa and A. Gavilán (2013), «Macroeconomic adjustment under loose financing conditions 
in the construction sector», European Economic Review, Vol. 59, pp. 19-34.
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credit market and, also, the development of new financing instruments and channels 
determine, in part, the flow of new business start-ups and the inter-sectoral reallocation of 
productive resources, along with the movement of such resources towards the highest-
productivity firms. In this connection, the recent changes observed in financial markets 
– some the outcome of the crisis, others the result of intense regulatory reform in this field – 
should be borne in mind when analysing the factors promoting or restricting the efficient 
allocation of productive resources across firms. 
Irrespective of credit accessibility and of the presence of different regulations that distort 
business start-ups, failures and growth, the strengthening of the business sector will 
necessarily be boosted by productivity gains. In this connection, improving the population’s 
vocational skills, promoting innovation and the adoption of technology, and eliminating the 
obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources towards the most productive ends should 
be an economic policy priority. 
On that basis, this chapter offers an in-depth analysis of business dynamics in Spain from 
three standpoints. Firstly, a series of analytical and quantitative elements are presented 
that highlight the macroeconomic effects of business dynamics, with regard both to 
adjustment processes in the short term and to potential growth in the long term. Secondly, 
business dynamics in Spain are characterised, in comparison with peer countries, and the 
significance of productivity as a determinant of such dynamics is emphasised. Finally, 
there is discussion as to what extent Spanish business start-ups, failures and growth are 
linked to different product and labour market regulations, their financing conditions and 
the level of employer and employee professional skills. 
An increase in the flows of business start-ups and in the rate of failure of the least productive 
firms, and a better adaptation of the size of those that remain in the face of changing 
market conditions, tend to increase the degree of competition in markets and may provide 
a boost to innovation and the adoption of technology. Likewise, greater business dynamics, 
in the terms described, provide for the reallocation of resources towards the highest-
productivity firms, which translates into higher growth potential for the economy as a 
whole. 
In the short term, the greater the competition in markets is, the lower the level of prices 
and, concurrently, the higher output and employment will be. Furthermore, greater 
competition also promotes and accelerates the reallocation of production factors 
towards their most efficient uses. The cost of production may also increase owing to 
the presence of barriers to entry in the markets for intermediate goods and to excessive 
regulation or administrative burdens associated with the pursuit of an activity, and to 
the expenses arising from the lawsuits a firm must face in order to ensure contractual 
performance. 
Business dynamics also determine the adjustment of the response to economic shocks. 
For instance, given an increase in business opportunities, the flow of business start-ups 
will tend to reduce the average price mark-up relative to unit labour costs, leading to an 
increase in production, thereby amplifying the impact of the positive shocks. For example, 
Box 4.1 shows, using a macroeconomic model developed and estimated to capture these 
effects, that the response of the economy to a temporary increase in productivity is all the 
greater the lower the costs of business start-ups. Conversely, recovery after an adverse 
shock entailing the failure of a significant number of firms will be all the slower the greater 
Improving the quality of the 
resources available in the 
economy is essential for 
raising growth capacity in a 
sustained fashion 
2  The macroeconomic 
consequences of 
business start-ups, 
failures and growth
There are several channels 
through which business 
dynamics have macroeconomic 
implications 
First, greater business 
dynamics are conducive to 
competition,…
… facilitate the adjustment of 
the economy in the face of 
shocks…
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the duration and cost associated with the winding-up of less productive firms and the 
lower the start-up rate of new competitors.4
In the long term, the rates at which technological innovations originate and are adopted 
also depend on the level of market competition and on the degree of business dynamism. 
R+D investment requires a return which, on occasions, can only come about through the 
exercise of a degree of market power, at least over some period of time. However, in other 
instances, protecting new ideas need not be incompatible with the presence of incentives 
to innovate in a competitive environment. Many technological innovations have arisen and 
been disseminated outside the protection of patents. Indeed, in competitive environments, 
firms can also make technological innovations profitable; and these, moreover, will be 
disseminated more rapidly the fewer the obstacles to business start-ups.
Indeed, regarding the generation and dissemination of innovation, the role of new 
entrepreneurs should not be underestimated, even when new productive units with a small 
number of employees are involved. Market structures and institutions that facilitate the 
entry and exit of firms can promote the accumulation of knowledge, investment in 
intangible assets, through experience, and the mobility of entrepreneurs and innovators, 
all of these factors being necessary for raising productivity.5
There is abundant empirical evidence confirming that, within each sector of activity, firms 
of very different sizes and productivity exist alongside one another. This heterogeneity is 
the outcome of entrenched patterns that are common to many countries: new firms 
entering a specific market are, on average, of a smaller size and therefore have greater 
growth potential than those already established. In particular, there is a negative association 
between productivity growth and employment, on one hand, and a positive one between 
the size and age of firms, on the other. Likewise, older firms that have a greater number of 
workers have a higher survival rate than newly created firms.6
That means that the distribution by firm size both at the aggregate level and within each 
sector is asymmetrical, insofar as this distribution contains a greater density of small-sized 
firms. In Spain, this asymmetry is very marked. As is set out in greater detail in the following 
section, almost 90% of Spanish firms have fewer than 10 employees, while those with over 
50 workers account for a very small percentage compared with that of peer countries. 
Aggregate shocks, which affect all firms jointly, are less frequent and less extensive than 
idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. those that affect companies individually. The aggregate 
consequences of these idiosyncratic shocks depend on the composition of the productive 
system, in terms of firm size, and on price and wage rigidities. For example, in an economy 
with flexible prices, if the large firms account for a high portion of the employment in a 
country, the business cycle may be strongly influenced by its idiosyncratic shocks,7 
… and promote the 
development and adoption of 
new technologies, fomenting 
productivity growth 
Business dynamics also 
determine the degree of 
heterogeneity within each 
sector…
… which has a bearing on the 
source and transmission of 
shocks, affecting the scale of 
economic fluctuations
4  For a theoretical analysis of these types of transmission channel in customary macroeconomic models, see, for 
example, F. Bilbiie, F. Ghironi and M. Melitz (2012), “Endogenous Entry, Product Variety, and Business Cycles”, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 120(2), pp. 304‑345; N. Jaimovich and M. Floetotto (2008), “Firm dynamics, 
markup variations, and the business cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55, pp. 1238‑1252, and G. L. 
Clementi and B. Palazzo (2015), “Entry, Exit, Firm Dynamics, and Aggregate Fluctuations”, American Economic 
Journal Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
5  See X. Vives (2008), “Innovation and competitive pressure”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 56, pp. 
419-469.
6  See CompNet Task Force (2014), Micro-Based Evidence of EU Competitiveness. The CompNet Database, ECB 
working paper 1634. 
7  This possibility is given the name of «granular hypothesis». See X. Gabaix  (2011), “The granular origins of 
aggregate fluctuations”, Econometrica, vol. 79(3), mayo, pp. 733-772, and V. Carvalho and B. Grassi (2015), Firm 
Dynamics and the Granular Hypothesis, manuscript.
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although this correlation diminishes when the degree of nominal inertia of prices is greater.8 
Conversely, in economies where small and medium-sized firms have a greater weight, 
aggregate economic fluctuations tend to be associated to a greater extent with global 
demand- or supply-side shocks.
Another factor that influences the aggregate consequences of idiosyncratic shocks is 
the growth potential of newly created companies. This effect is particularly significant 
in relation to the duration of expansions and of recessions. Hence, if after a positive 
shock the flow of business start-ups increases and new firms harness their growth 
potential, the expansion generated by the shock will be much more durable and 
sustained over time than if the new start-ups face restrictions constraining their growth 
capacity. 
Business start-ups and their growth are influenced not only by product market 
regulations, but also by labour market-related regulations. For instance, labour 
regulations affect individual’s incentive to work as an entrepreneur, a private-sector 
wage-earner or a public-sector employee, or to remain idle. Also, the fact that national 
or regional-level collective bargaining prevails over that at the firm level, imposing 
working conditions on new start-ups in the related sector, may prevent the entry of 
firms initially with low productivity but high growth potential. Discrimination in the 
application of certain labour rules on the basis of firm size may also generate obstacles 
to the growth of younger firms. 
Business start-up and failure rates are mirrored by worker flows. The higher these rates 
are, the higher the respective entry rates into employment and unemployment will be. 
Further, a high business failure rate and a low growth of small firms will tend, in general, to 
bring about greater labour instability and a lesser accumulation of work experience on the 
part of employees. Finally, in light of firm entry and exit rates, labour instability is greater if 
the legislation on employment protection involves incentives for staff turnover through the 
continuing use of temporary contracts.
Box 4.1 shows, for illustrative purposes, the results of an exercise assessing different 
economic policy measures related to business dynamics. In particular, the effect of a 
reform that increases competition in the product markets through a reduction in entry 
costs and that provides for the growth of those small firms with sufficient productivity is 
compared with those effects arising from a reform that generates a genuine improvement 
in small firms’ productivity. The main conclusion of the exercise is that although a reduction 
in entry costs increases the range of potentially profitable business opportunities, many of 
which ultimately translate into new firms in a limited period of time, a measure of this type 
may reduce aggregate productivity if growth is not assisted via the reduction of firms’ 
adjustment costs. The exercise further shows that the measures that appear to have the 
biggest positive impact on the economy as a whole are those aimed directly at raising 
average productivity and, in particular, that of small firms. 
There follows a characterisation of business dynamics in Spain from the time and 
international perspective, in relation both to the level and composition of firm entries and 
exits and to the growth of firms that are already established. It should be borne in mind 
that this type of analysis faces difficulties derived from a lack of data that are homogeneous 
Business dynamics are 
influenced by labour market 
regulations and affect the 
functioning of the labour 
market 
There are various economic 
policy instruments linked to 
business demography with 
which to boost competition, 
productivity and well-being 
3  A characterisation of 
business dynamics in 
Spain in the 
international context 
8  J. Andrés and P. Burriel (2014), Inflation dynamics in a model with firm entry and (some) heterogeneity, Banco de 
España Working Paper No. 1427.
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and sufficiently representative in all countries. To resolve these difficulties, several statistical 
sources9 have been combined in the evidence presented below. 
Start-up and failure rates can usually be measured by the ratio of the flow of firm start-ups 
and failures over the course of one year to the number of firms existing in the previous period. 
These rates have a marked cyclical component, as business start-ups are substantially 
greater in expansions than in recessions, while the opposite occurs with failure rates.
On Eurostat data (see panel 1 of Chart 4.1), in the years immediately prior to the crisis 
(2005-2007), Spain posted a business start-up rate close to the EU average, i.e. 9%, a 
similar figure to that observed in France (10%) and somewhat higher than that for Germany 
and Italy (5% and 8%, respectively). In this period, within the EU, the highest business 
start-up rates were observed in the United Kingdom (15%) and in certain Eastern European 
countries, such as Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia (17 %, 14 % and 14 %, respectively). 
Regarding the failure rate, Spain’s rate was lower than the average, at 4%, a similar figure 
to that of Germany, Italy and France (6%, 5% and 5%, respectively). In the international 
context, there is a positive association between start-ups and failures, whereby those 
countries that had high failure rates  – the United Kingdom (10%) and Eastern European 
countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia (7%, 7% and 8%) – are also those that 
posted the highest start-up rates. In Spain, the business start-up rate observed over the 
course of these years far exceeded the failure rate (see panel 3 of Chart 4.1). 
As from 2007 there was a significant increase in the firm failure rate while the start-up rate 
decreased, to the extent that, according to DIRCE (the National Statistics Institute Central 
Companies Directory), net declines were observed in the number of firms up to 2012. In 
2013, a net positive change was discerned, owing to a decline in the number of failures and 
a rise in start-ups. The following year, however, the number of firms stabilised. In any event, 
the differences by sector of activity are appreciable. Hence, although the recession had an 
adverse impact on business dynamics in all sectors (see panel 4 of Chart 4.1), the 
construction sector was that most affected by the crisis, both in the reduction in firm entries 
and in the increase in firm exits, with sizeable net declines being evidenced from 2008. 
These effects were on a much lesser scale in the services and, especially, industrial sectors. 
The effect of the business cycle on firm start-up and failure rates can be proxied drawing on the 
estimated relationship between these rates and GDP growth for a set of countries. According to 
the results of estimates of this type, it may be concluded that, although in Spain the pre-2008 
pattern of business start-ups was similar to that in other countries, since then it has been 
considerably lower, even given the economic recession (panel 5 of Chart 4.1). Moreover, 
although firm failures throughout the recession were in step with expectations given the scale 
of the decline in GDP, prior to 2007 in Spain a greater number of firms survived relative to what 
corresponded to the average behaviour in other countries (see panel 6 of Chart 4.1).   
It can be seen in Spain’s case that both newly created firms and those discontinuing their 
activity show lower productivity levels than the average productivity of their sector. Firm 
entries during the 1998-2007 period, in particular, evidenced a level of productivity that is 
almost 20% below the sector average, suggesting the existence of a necessary learning-
During the expansion prior to 
the crisis, Spain had a similar 
business start-up rate to, and 
a business failure rate 
somewhat lower than, the 
average for the EU countries 
The crisis substantially 
reduced the business start-up 
rate and raised the failure rate
Even taking into account the 
effect of the business cycle, 
Spain has posted relatively 
low business start-up rates 
since 2008 
Start-up and failed firms are 
less productive than 
established firms…
9  The information for Spain has been drawn from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO), 
the Balance of Payments (BP), the Banco de España Central Credit Register (CIRBE) and the INE Central 
Companies Directory (DIRCE); the sources for the remaining countries are AMADEUS, CompNet [a research 
network on the competitiveness of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)], Eurostat (Structural 
indicators) and OECD (Entrepreneurship at a Glance). However, for the correct interpretation of the statistics 
discussed below, it should be borne in mind that not all the databases used are internationally harmonised. 
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SOURCES: European Commission, OECD, INE and Banco de España.
a Eurostat distinguishes three legal forms of businesses: public or private limited liability commercial-law companies, workers' limited or unlimited liability 
companies and unlimited liability sole propietorships. The information is limited to public or private limited liability commercial-law companies to increase 
the comparability of the statistics, since data on sole proprietorships are prone to greater measurement errors. Limited liability commercial-law companies 
account for 40%, since sole proprietorships account for somewhat more than 50%. In terms of employment, however, their contribution is much larger. 
Sectorally, the information is limited to industry and services excluding the management activities of holding companies, general government, defence 
and compulsory social security, education and healthcare, other welfare and services activities provided to the community, personal services, household 
activities and extraterritorial organsiations and bodies.
b Units started up are defined as businesses started up in the current or previous two periods and failures are defined as those which cease to exist in the current 
or previous two periods. The sectoral classification is that of the two-digit NACE. Weighted by the sector average to prevent different sectoral compositions in 
business additions or reductions from affecting the results.
c Residuals relate to two regressions of business start-up and failure rates and GDP growth. Sample consisting of OECD countries between 2002 and 2012. A 
residual of –1 denotes a start-up or, where applicable, failure, rate which is 1 percentage point less than that estimated by means of historical and inter-country 
correlation of the business cycle and the relevant rate.
CHART 4.1BUSINESS START-UP AND FAILURE DYNAMICS IN SPAIN
0
5
10
15
20
BG GB EE SK LT DK HU LU FR PL CZ LV ES NL PT IT SI NO AT FI BE DE CY GR SE MT
1  BUSINESS START-UP RATE BEFORE THE CRISIS (2005-2007) (a)
% of active firms
0
5
10
15
GB PT SK LU EE HU BG NL DK CZ DE IT LT PL FR FI ES SI SE NO AT LV BE MT CY GR
2  BUSINESS FAILURE RATE BEFORE THE CRISIS (2005-2007) (a)
% of active firms
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
 START-UPS  FAILURES
% of active firms
3  BUSINESS START-UP AND FAILURE RATES IN SPAIN (b)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
START-UPS IND. START-UPS CONST. START-UPS SERV.
FAILURES CONST.FAILURES IND. FAILURES SERV.
% of active firms
4  START-UP AND FAILURE RATES IN THE MAIN SECTORS OF ACTIVITY 
IN SPAIN (b)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
5 RESIDUALS OF THE START-UP MODEL (c)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
6 RESIDUALS OF THE FAILURE MODEL (c)
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 100 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 4. BUSINESS DYNAMICS IN SPAIN: CHARACTERISTICS, DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS
curve period so that new firms converge on average productivity levels in their sector of 
activity. Likewise, failing companies posted, on average, a level of productivity that was 27% 
below that of their sectoral average, whereby their disappearance gave rise to a positive 
composition effect on productivity growth at the aggregate level (panel 1 of Table 4.1). 
Since 2008 the selection of firms, among both entries and exits, has produced a greater 
positive effect on the economy’s aggregate productivity. Specifically, start-ups since then 
have shown a level of productivity closer to the sectoral average, while those firms exiting 
had a significantly lower level. These results are common to a broad set of sectors of the 
Spanish economy. In all cases, both start-ups and failures show of activity levels below the 
…although, during the crisis, 
start-up firms’ productivity 
improved slightly in relative 
terms, while the less 
productive firms disappeared
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Based on data from the microdata files of the Central Companies Directory (DIRCE), together with microdata from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office.
b Calculated as the change in the productivity level in a given period, by including corporations created in the current year and two previous years in the calculation 
of average productivity.
c Calculated as the change in the productivity level in a given period, by excluding the corporations closed in the current year and two subsequent years in the 
calculation of average productivity.
Total Industry Construction Services
1 By sector
1998-
2007
2008-
2012
1998-
2007
2008-
2012
1998-
2007
2008-
2012
1998-
2007
2008-
2012
Average of the relative levels of apparent labour productivity 
for the period
001001001001001001001001snoitaroproc latoT    
    New corporations in the current year and 
    two previous years 83.4 88.5 84.8 90.1 86.1 94.6 82.6 87.2
3.1116.3118.5112.0113.9017.7018.1119.111snoitaroproc gniniameR    
    Corporations closed in the current year and 
    two subsequent years 73.1 57.2 70.2 52.8 81.8 56.6 71.5 58.4
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growth for the period
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    and two previous years (b) -6.2 -2.2 -3.4 -1.1 -5.8 -1.2 -7.0 -2.7
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    and two subsequent years (c) 3.2 7.4 3.0 7.1 2.2 11.6 3.5 6.5
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growth for the period
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    New corporations in the current year and two previous years (b) -6.3 -4.8 -2.7 -2.0
    Corporations closed in the current year and two subsequent years (c) 3 4 5 8
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average for the related sector. At the same time, the selection of firms has become more 
intensely geared to the most productive ones (see panel 1 of Table 4.1). 
The increase in newly created firms’ productivity relative to those already in place can be seen 
both in the sectors most affected by the recession, proxied by those in which there were 
declines in employment, and in those that recorded growth in employment. However, firms 
exiting sectors with declines in employment have had lower productivity than those remaining 
in place in sectors with employment growth, which indicates a relationship between firm exits 
and the cyclical position of the sector in question (panel 2 of Table 4.1). The new business 
start-up patterns and the fact they are across the board suggests that some improvement is 
taking place in the selection of new firms on the basis of their productivity, which might be 
symptomatic of a favourable structural change in Spanish business demography. 
On Eurostat data, newly created Spanish firms are atypical regarding their initial size and 
survival rates. Indeed, the initial size of Spanish start-ups is generally small, standing on 
average at 4.6 employees in the industry, exceeding only Japanese and Luxembourg 
companies (4.0 and 4.3 employees, respectively). At the other extreme are France, Finland 
and the Netherlands, with an average size of 23.7, 17.9 and 16 employees, respectively. In the 
services sector, Spain has the smallest initial size of EU countries as a whole, with 
2.4 employees. According to DIRCE figures, it is estimated that this characteristic became 
more accentuated during the crisis, given that the average size of start-ups in Spain fell as 
from 2008. If, between 2000 and 2007, 78% of start-ups with more than one employee had 
between one and five workers, this percentage rose to 82% in the subsequent period (see 
panel 1 of Chart 4.2). Moreover, the probability of survival of Spanish firms after five years is 
also low in comparative terms (see panel 2 of Chart 4.2). In this case, during the crisis, the 
probability of Spanish start-ups rather than established firms disappearing increased further.
A widely documented fact in studies on business dynamics is the positive association 
between size and productivity. The fundaments of this association are, however, less 
evident. First, it may be the outcome of the presence of economies of scale that generates 
productivity gains when firm size increases. Further, it may be the case that firms are 
intrinsically more or less productive and only grow insofar as the factors of their environment 
(economic, regulatory, institutional and financial factors, inter alia) allow it, once their true 
productive potential has been disclosed. In the first instance, size would cause productivity; 
in the second, causality would be the other way around, from productivity to size. 
Although in practice there will foreseeably be numerous causality relationships between these 
two variables, in both directions, one way of attempting to discern their relative weight is to 
compare employment growth in two identical firms up to a specific time at which there can be 
seen to be a significant exogenous increase in productivity or size at only one of them. The 
results of such an analysis are shown in Table 4.2.10 The top section in this table shows that in 
the year following a 10% increase in productivity, the related firm begins to grow more than its 
counterpart, such that after five years employment in the first firm has grown 8 pp more than 
that in the second firm. The lower section in Table 4.2 plots the changes in productivity for the 
two identical firms up to a specific time at which there can be seen to be an increase in size at 
only one of them (also normalised at 10%). In the second instance, no significant differences are 
found between the growth in productivity of both firms even after five years. Accordingly, these 
results suggest that productivity growth will give rise to an increase in firms size, while in the 
short term business growth would not of itself give rise to evident gains in productivity. 
The improvement in the 
relative productivity of newly 
created firms has come about 
in most sectors 
Nonetheless, the size and 
survival rate of newly created 
firms are lower in Spain than 
in peer countries 
Increased productivity is a 
determinant of business 
growth and development 
10  See E. Moral Benito (2016), Growing by learning, Banco de España Working Paper, forthcoming.
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SOURCES: OECD and European Commission.
a According to C. Criscuolo, P. N. Gal and C. Menon (2014) in The Dynamics of Employment Growth: New Evidence from 18 Countries, OECD Science, Technology 
and Industry Policy Papers no. 14, OECD Publishing.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: * , ** and *** denote significance coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets.
a See E. Moral-Benito (2016), Growing by learning, Documentos de Trabajo, Banco de España, forthcoming. This exercise is based on propensity score matching 
which identifies a group of firms that are equal in terms of their observable characteristics (size, age, productivity, sector of activity, export status, etc.) in an initial 
period. This gorup is divided into two: a treatment group consisting of firms which have shown productivity (or employment) growth of more than 10% in the initial 
period, and a control group consisting of firms which have not shown such growth. Next, the average employment (or productivity) growth of each group in the 
following five periods (years) is compared and the differences between the two groups are checked to determine whether they are statistically different from zero.
1 2 3 4 5
Of a productivity shock on
Employment growth
   0.017***
(0.004)
   0.012***
(0.004)
   0.010**
(0.005)
0.004
(0.007)
0.003
(0.006)
Cumulative employment growth
    0.017***
(0.004)
   0.037***
(0.005)
   0.045***
(0.006)
   0.075***
(0.007)
   0.084***
(0.009)
Of a size shock on
Productivity growth
 0.017*
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.014
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.010
(0.014)
Cumulative productivity growth
0.017*
(0.009)
0.012
(0.012)
0.006
(0.017)
0.012
(0.008)
0.007
(0.031)
After the number of periods indicated
ESTIMATED EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY (a) TABLE 4.2
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The analysis of high-growth firms, which are defined as those at which there is a significant 
increase in size, measured by employment, over a short period, also stresses the 
significance of productivity (see Table 4.3).11 Specifically, it is found that these firms’ 
productivity growth is a determinant of the increase in their size, while size, at least among 
firms notable for rapid development, does not increase productivity growth. Insofar as 
productivity growth in Spain is low, from an international standpoint, it is not surprising that 
the percentage of high-growth firms, according to the OECD definition (see panel 1 of 
Chart 4.3), is also low in relative terms.
The number of high-growth 
firms is fairly low when 
compared with peer countries 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
NOTE: * , ** and *** denote significance coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets.
a Results of a linear probability model estimated using firm data in the Central Balance Sheet Data Office. The coefficients represent the marginal effects of each 
variable on the probability that a firm has high growth. All the results include fixed effects as the control group. High employment growth firms are defined as the 
10% of firms with the highest value which results from multiplying the absolute change in employment by the ratio of employment in the subsequent period (t+1) 
to employment in t. High productivity growth firms are defined as the 10% of firms that have the highest productivity growth rate and have not undergone falls 
in their employment level. Both definitions are calculated at the level of sector (NACE two digit categories) and year.
b The first two categories refer to firms which have applied for credit to a bank from which they do not have outstanding loans.The third refers to firms which, 
although they have not applied for credit to a new bank, have increased the number or amount of loans from their customary banks or have lines of credit 
which are mostly unused. Finally, the reference group consists of firms which neither request credit from new banks nor increase their positions with their 
customary banks.
c The reference category consists of firms of age below 2 years.
2002-2007 2008-2012 2002-2007 2008-2012
High productivity growth in the previous period
    0.012***
(0.001)
    0.019***
(0.001)
  -0.244***
(0.001)
  -0.268***
(0.001)
High employment growth in the previous period
    0.163***
(0.001)
    0.177***
(0.001)
  -0.006***
(0.001)
  -0.007***
(0.001)
Percentage of permanent jobs at the firm
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
    0.032***
(0.002)
    0.058***
(0.002)
Financing conditions (b)
    At least one credit application granted 
    0.015***
(0.001)
    0.014***
(0.001)
    0.015***
(0.001)
    0.009***
(0.001)
    All applications rejected
    0.009***
(0.001)
    0.008***
(0.001)
    0.008***
(0.001)
    0.002**
(0.001)
    No applications made, but no restrictions on credit 
    0.014***
(0.001)
    0.015***
(0.001)
    0.011***
(0.001)
    0.006***
(0.001)
Firm age (c)
3 - 5 years
  -0.028***
(0.001)
  -0.046***
(0.002)
  -0.059***
(0.001)
  -0.065***
(0.002)
6 - 10 years
-0.039***
(0.002)
-0.066***
(0.002)
  -0.072***
(0.002)
  -0.087***
(0.002)
11 - 15 years
  -0.045***
(0.002)
  -0.080***
(0.002)
  -0.072***
(0.002)
  -0.098***
(0.003)
16 -20 years
  -0.050***
(0.002)
-0.093***
(0.003)
  -0.072***
(0.003)
  -0.111***
(0.003)
> 21 years
  -0.054***
(0.004)
  -0.011***
(0.003)
  -0.068***
(0.003)
  -0.012***
(0.004)
Probability of high employment 
growth
Probability of high productivity 
growth
PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH (a) TABLE 4.3
11  See C. Guillamón, E. Moral Benito and S. Puente (2016), High growth in employment and productivity: Dynamic 
interactions, and the role of financial constraints, Banco de España Working Paper, forthcoming.
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SOURCES: OECD, AMADEUS, European Commission, ECB's Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), INE and the Banco de España's Central de
Información de Riesgos and Central de Balances.
a Per the CompNet definition, which encompasses those firms that raise their levels of employment by more than 20% per year over a three-year period.
b Annual average in each of the periods of covariance between the market share of the firms in each sector, measured by value added, and their total factor productivity 
relative to the sector average. Greater covariance indicates better allocation of productive resources among the firms of a given sector.
c Productivity ratio between Spanish firms and the average in France, Germany and Italy (average = 1). The AMADEUS and CompNet data refer to total factor 
productivity and the Eurostat and OECD data to apparent labour productivity.
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Not only does there appear to be a small number of high-growth firms in Spain, but also 
the positive correlation between productivity and growth is less than that observed in other 
countries (panel 3 of Chart 4.3). In short, other factors unrelated to productivity appear to 
play a more relevant role in the accumulation of resources at certain firms. 
The aforementioned business start-up, growth and failure patterns help justify the fact that 
Spain’s distribution of firms evidences a greater weight for smaller size than that observed in 
other countries (see panel 2 of Chart 4.3). It is also seen that Spanish firms’ productivity is at 
least 15% lower than that of their German, French and Italian counterparts, even when 
comparing size ranges, although this difference is significantly greater in the group of firms 
with 1 to 9 employees, where the weight of start-ups is greater (see panel 4 of Chart 4.3). 
Among the key factors for start-ups are access to financing, regulations (whether fiscal, 
administrative or labour), the availability of human capital and innovation-related possibilities 
and incentives (see Chart 4.4). The same factors are likewise crucial regarding firms’ 
growth potential, in addition to other factors that may be specific to each sector. 
The creation and growth in the size of firms are influenced by the availability of external 
financing to undertake new investment projects, which in Spain’s case and, especially, for 
small firms occurs in the main through bank loans. In the immediate run-up to the crisis, 
bank lending standards in respect of firms were relatively lax, which translated into 
abundant bank financing that was especially conducive to the creation and survival of 
small firms. However, the firms resorting to lending did not necessarily have high 
productivity. Indeed, before 2007 no positive association can be found between the 
likelihood of obtaining financing and business productivity (see panel 1 of Chart 4.5). 
During the crisis financial conditions tightened notably. Contributing to this were various 
factors such as the deterioration in credit institutions’ financing conditions, partly as a 
result of financial fragmentation problems in the euro area, and the effects of the crisis on 
borrowers’ creditworthiness. Small firms, especially start-ups, saw the biggest deterioration 
in their bank lending access conditions, partly as a result of their higher credit risk but also 
because of the diminished amount and quality of information that banks have on them. 
With a view to mitigating these frictions, public financial support programmes for this type 
of firm were extended (see Box 4.2). Notwithstanding, the lesser availability of financing 
contributed to a notable decline in start-ups and, consequently, to the reduction in private 
business investment. 
Following the crisis, firms’ access to bank financing has improved, especially in the case 
of SMEs. This, combined with the increase in the demand for credit, has been mirrored by 
an increase in the volume of funds granted. These developments have been accompanied 
by a certain degree of credit supply selection among lenders, whereby access to financing 
has improved more markedly in the case of those firms in a more favourable economic and 
financial position.12 A reflection of this has been an increase in the positive association 
between the obtaining of loans by firms and their productivity (see panel 1 of Chart 4.5). 
Accordingly, the course of recent credit flows points to a degree of reallocation of resources 
In Spain, moreover, the 
correlation between business 
growth and productivity is 
relatively low
As a result, the distribution of 
firms in Spain is relatively 
skewed towards smaller and 
low-productivity companies 
4  Some determinants of 
business dynamics in 
Spain 
Access to financing, 
regulation, the availability of 
human capital and innovative 
capacity are fundamental 
factors of business dynamics 
4.1 BUSINESS FINANCING
Bank loans are the main 
source of Spanish firms’ 
external financing
Financial conditions worsened 
substantially during the crisis 
In the current phase of 
recovery, a pick-up in 
financing can be seen which, 
moreover, is targeted on more 
productive firms…
12  For further information see Box 5.2 of the Banco de España 2014 Annual Report del Banco de España de 2014.
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across firms, meaning they would be directed to a greater extent towards more productive 
companies.
Some of the structural reforms undertaken in recent years should contribute to lessening 
the distortions that encouraged investment in real estate assets at the expense of 
alternative investment in projects with potentially higher expected returns but with less 
collateral. Specifically, both the recent changes in financial regulation and the range of 
fiscal and regulatory measures in the area of housing and the rental market should have 
contributed to curbing an excessive concentration of credit in real estate assets.13 A 
preliminary assessment of recent reforms in the area of insolvency proceedings suggests 
that such reforms would have resulted in the greater efficiency of these proceedings (see 
Box 4.3). That should be conducive to a greater use of insolvency proceedings by firms 
…while the various reforms 
undertaken have lessened the 
distortions that were 
encouraging investment in real 
estate assets at the expense 
of other activities 
SOURCE: Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, and INE.
a Data drawn from the module on the most problematic factors for doing business, in the Global Competitiveness Report. Respondents have to select, from 
a list of factors, the five most problematic ones for doing business in the country and assign them a score ranging from 1, for the least problematic, to 5, for 
the most problematic. The index is a weighted average of the responses.
b Data drawn from the module devoted to opinion on the business environment, of the INE business confidence index. It represents the difference between the 
percentage of firms giving a high importance to those factors and the percentage of firms giving them a low importance.
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13  J. S. Mora Sanguinetti y M. Rubio (2014), “Recent Reforms in Spanish Housing Markets: An Evaluation using a 
DSGE Model”, Economic Modelling, vol. 44.
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and, therefore, it should promote an increase in the weight of project financing with a high 
potential return and a higher level of risk. There is in fact evidence that the inefficiencies 
evidenced by business insolvency proceedings as a mechanism to restructure debt – in 
comparison with mortgage foreclosures – skewed the granting of credit in the past towards 
projects collateralised by real estate. 
In this respect, developments in recent years reveal major changes in the composition of 
firms’ investment flows, which were no doubt also in response to cyclical factors, making 
it difficult to assess the role the recent reforms may have played to date. Hence, the weight 
of housing in overall gross capital formation has fallen by around 15 pp since 2008, while 
that of gross formation in capital goods and the acquisition of intellectual property has 
increased (see panel 2 of Chart 4.5). 
The increase in gross formation in capital goods appears to be the result of a sectoral 
reallocation following the fall in the weight of construction and real estate services in 
aggregate value added, since there is no evidence of an increase in the former within the 
industrial and services sectors. However, there is indeed a continuous increase in gross 
formation in intellectual property, which quickened after 2009, especially in the services 
sector (panels 3 and 4 of Chart 4.5).
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Credit approval and business TFP regression coefficient based on size, age, financial costs, asset volume and sector of activity of the firm. A negative (positive) 
coefficient denotes a negative (positive) correlation between productivity and credit approval. The broken lines show the confidence interval of the estimate.
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As regards the formalities for creating a new firm, Spain is ranked in a relatively unfavourable 
position at the international level. For example, according to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business indicator, Spain ranks 82nd, at some distance from the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy, albeit better than Germany. However, there have recently been considerable 
improvements in this area, essentially owing to the creation of single windows and the 
possibility of using responsible statements as opposed to the previous requirement 
entailing the approval of a licence. At present seven procedural steps, 14 days and 5.2% 
of income are necessary for a business start-up, compared with 10, 61 and 15%, 
respectively, in 2010 (see upper panel of Table 4.4). 
Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind here that business start-ups are still subject to a 
plethora of regional and local government regulations, an aspect which is not reflected in 
the aforementioned indicator. The information available in this connection for 19 Spanish 
cities confirms that there is significant regional heterogeneity, which, for the sake of 
facilitating start-ups, would warrant rigorous assessment of the different instruments used 
that help identify good practices in this regulatory policy area.14
At the state level, there is a broad range of business size-contingent regulations, which 
may act as a deterrent to business growth.15 Likewise, the regional governments have 
increased their regulatory capacity, whereby the heterogeneity in the regional steps needed 
to undertake investment projects might not only be curtailing start-ups, but also their 
4.2  THE IMPACT OF 
REGULATIONS
Although the obstacles to 
competition have 
progressively diminished, 
there is room for improvement 
in entry regulations, especially 
at the regional and local 
government levels 
To promote the growth of 
firms, it is also necessary to 
reduce size-contingent 
regulations and those that 
restrict activity in other 
geographical markets...
14  See Doing Business en España, 2015 (http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/reports/subnational-reports/spain).
15  See the evidence on the impact of specific regulatory thresholds in the distribution of firms by size in Chapter 
3 of the Banco de España 2014 Annual Report and in the European Commission’s Report on Spain 2016, with 
an exhaustive examination of the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. In this respect, 
fiscal and labour regulatory arbitrage affects the difference between the number of firms and the number of 
entrepreneurs, meaning that the average size of firms measured in legal terms need not match the average size 
of resources managed under a single management unit.
SOURCE: The World Bank (http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/).
a With these indicators, the country with the best practices has position number 1, countries with successively poorer practices occupy increasingly higher 
positions.
Spain United Kingdom United States Germany France Italy
Ease of doing business indicators (a) 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
54447272515177663343rotacidni llarevO
0584237270101944471342887ssenisub a gnitratS
Dealing with construction permits 97 101 23 23 33 33 13 13 39 40 79 86
9585022233442451614787yticirtcele gnitteG
Registering property 48 49 44 45 33 34 62 62 82 85 22 24
7909971782422291719525tiderc gnitteG
Protecting minority investors 44 29 4 4 32 35 46 49 27 29 33 36
73173785012786358451610697sexat gniyaP
Trading across borders 1 1 36 38 33 34 34 35 1 1 1 1
1114241212111121233629393stcartnoc gnicrofnE
Resolving insolvency 23 25 12 13 4 5 3 3 22 24 21 23
Memorandum item
Number of countries surveyed 189
WORLD BANK DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS FOR SPAIN TABLE 4.4
SPANISH POSITION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 109 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 4. BUSINESS DYNAMICS IN SPAIN: CHARACTERISTICS, DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS
subsequent capacity to grow. In this respect, it appears that firms have progressively 
reduced their presence in regions other than that of the parent, despite the fact that for 
many firms, especially in the services sector, direct investment is the sole means of 
harnessing economies of scale (see panel 1 of Chart 4.6). To correct these distortions, it is 
vital to implement the Market Unity Guarantee Law, in particular the legislation on the so-
called “sectoral committees”, whose aim is to reduce and homogenise the regulations 
applicable to the different areas. 
Finally, economic regulations may favour certain firms which, irrespective of their 
productivity, may obtain operating cost advantages that enable them to gain a greater 
market share. Generally, small and young firms face greater distortions than large 
corporations, which hampers their growth until they reach an optimum size (see panel 2 
of Chart 4.6). This, in turn, may give rise to an inappropriate allocation of resources, owing 
to excess investment by the least productive firms and a reduction in aggregate 
production. 
The specific nature of these distortions is very varied. For instance, in the labour 
market area, firm-level collective bargaining agreements, substantial changes to 
…and to reduce distortions in 
the prices of productive 
factors that prevent the 
appropriate growth of the 
most productive firms 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Measured by the effect of time dummies in a regression of the number of branches in other regions, controlling additionally for size, home region GDP and 
twodigit firm sector. A coefficient of -1 (+1) in a given year indicates that, on average, Spanish firms operated in one less (more) region with respect to 1995. 
The broken lines give the confidence intervals of the estimate.
b Marginal productivity of capital by firm size (age) relative to an American firm of the same size (age). Marginal productivity is calculated using the Hsieh and 
Klenow model. In this respect, it is implicitly assumed that in an economy without distortions, the marginal cost is the same for all firms in the same (four-digit) 
sector. Since all firms maximise profits by making their marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, in a frictionless economy all firms should have the same 
marginal revenue in equilibrium. Thus the difference between a firm's marginal revenue and the average marginal revenue of the sector is interpreted as a 
distortion faced by the firm in its operations which prevents it from achieving its optimum scale. More specifically, the marginal revenue of each sector in the 
United States is taken as reference, since this economy is assumed to have fewer distortions.
CHART 4.6BARRIERS TO BUSINESS EXPANSION AND GROWTH IN SPAIN
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1 - 9
employees
10 - 19
employees
 20 - 49
employees
50 - 249
employees
≥ 250 
employees
2  AVERAGE DISTORTION BY FIRM SIZE (b)
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of branches in other regions. 1995 = 0
1  SPANISH FIRMS ESTABLISHING A PRESENCE IN OTHER REGIONS WITH RESPECT TO 1995 (a)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1 - 2
years
3 - 5
years
6 - 10
years
11 - 20
years
≥ 21 years
3  AVERAGE DISTORTION BY FIRM AGE (b)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 110 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 4. BUSINESS DYNAMICS IN SPAIN: CHARACTERISTICS, DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS
working conditions or opt-outs are usually used almost exclusively by firms of a certain 
size and age, which leads young and small firms to have lower adjustment flexibility. 
Further, the legislation on public procurement contracts requires accreditation by the 
firm of a degree of solvency that is usually related to its level of business or its net 
worth, and to the works it has performed in recent years; accordingly, newly created 
firms have greater difficulties in bidding successfully, irrespective of their productivity. 
Likewise, there are distortions in other areas, such as the financial area or those 
relating to energy costs.16 In this respect, it must be ensured that the objectives 
pursued by these types of regulations, which introduce a degree of business 
discrimination, are compatible with competition between established companies and 
newly created firms, and that they do not pose added difficulties to business growth 
potential. 
Finally, business restructuring processes are a significant factor in the allocation of 
productive resources. In this connection, one variable that is given priority attention is the 
proportion of debt recovered by creditors, either through the winding-up of the firm or 
through its restructuring. According to Doing Business, this recovery rate in Spain is 71.2%, 
which ranks our country in a relatively favourable position (25th) and very close to that of 
France and Italy, although on average 18 months are needed to complete this operation. 
The Spanish system’s relatively high rate of recovery is due to the fact that many bank 
loans are secured, and the guarantee is enforced when the loan is unpaid, whereas the use 
of insolvency proceedings for companies that need their debt to be restructured is much 
lower.17 This characteristic, as discussed in the previous section, affects – more than the 
rate of destruction – the collateral requirements made by financial institutions and, in short, 
the type of investment projects that receive most financing (see Box 4.3). Accordingly, it is 
necessary to continue assessing to what extent the changes made to insolvency regulations 
increase the use and efficiency of liquidation mechanisms. 
Section 3 highlighted the importance of the low level of productivity in explaining business 
dynamics in Spain. In this respect, the professional skills of employees and employers and 
investment in innovation is key to explaining productivity differences at the firm level.18 
Various indicators show that the Spanish population has lower professional skills than 
those of our peer countries. These indicators are usually constructed on the basis of the 
population’s level of educational attainment drawing on various sources (official education 
system, and vocational, occupational and other unofficial training courses) and the 
attendant years and type of professional experience. Also informative are the results of 
standardised exams for the entire working age population on cognitive, numerical and 
reading comprehension abilities. In the case of the latter19, Spain stands out as a country 
Spain has a high loan recovery 
rate, even though the intensity 
and efficiency of business 
insolvency proceedings are 
insufficient 
4.3  PROFESSIONAL SKILLS, 
ACCESS TO INNOVATION 
AND PRODUCTIVITY
An improvement in workers’ 
cognitive skills and the use of 
best business practices would 
increase business 
productivity…
16  For example, in the financial area, different sized companies may adopt different corporate structures that affect 
access to financing and liability according to the share capital disbursed. Likewise in the energy area, there are 
permits for the sale of self-generated  electricity as from a certain plant capacity and the possibility of charging 
for the right to interrupt supply at large corporations.
17  See M. Celentani, M. García Posada and F. Gómez (2010), The Spanish Business Bankruptcy Puzzle and the 
Crisis, FEDEA Working Paper 2010 11, and M. García Posada and J. S. Mora Sanguinetti (2014), “Entrepreneurship 
and Enforcement Institutions: Disaggregated Evidence for Spain”, European Journal of Law and Economics, 
vol. 40 (1), pp. 49-74.
18  C. Syverson (2011), «What Determines Productivity?», Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49 (2), pp. 326 365, 
highlights three essential factors for explaining the different levels of business productivity: worker skills, 
business management and innovative capacity. 
19  The PIAAC database offers a uniform quantification for the OECD countries of cognitive, numerical and reading 
comprehension skills. The survey’s target population are individuals, not households, and sampling was 
undertaken with the help of INE.
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with one of the worst average scores (252), above only Italy (250), and far below the EU 
(271) and OECD (273) averages. 
As can be seen in panel 1 of Chart 4.7, in most countries sampled the self-employed show 
high levels of cognitive skills, in relation to the population as a whole. In Spain, however, 
this group brings up the rear in terms of average cognitive skills relative to the other OECD 
countries, standing above only Italy and Korea. 
To manage a firm, not only cognitive skills but also interactive, strategic, operational and 
control skills are needed. The indicators available on business management, which are 
positively correlated with measures of business productivity, profitability and survival, 
place Spain in a position below Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy (see panel 
2 of Chart 4.7). Among the different facets measured by the foregoing indicators, Spain is 
in a more unfavourable position regarding the policy of business incentives, including 
those relating to the identification of goals, appraisal and remuneration following their 
attainment. These results may be due to lower skills on the part of the managerial classes 
or to a lower degree of professionalisation of business management, in relation to the 
reference countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises, and/or to an 
institutional framework that constrains organisational capacity and efficient management 
of firms’ productive resources to a greater extent than in other countries. 
SOURCES: OECD and Banco de España.
a Result of mathematical test of the OECD's Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) .
b The World Management Survey constructs an indicator from surveys of business management practices and makes a subjective assessment of the situation. 
Specifically, it asseses operating capacity (e.g. it analyses the introduction of modern techniques or the adoption of best practices, appraisal capacity (including 
most notably information processing and continuous appraisal), ability to establish targets (clear objectives and time horizons) and the ability to incentivise 
(how incentives have consequences). The full questionnaire can be found at http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/wp-content/images/2010/09/Overview-of- 
Management-Questions-Across-Sectors.pdf.
c Data of Northern Ireland.
CHART 4.7CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN SPAIN
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The indices of quality of the labour factor, which show changes in the composition of 
employment in terms of level of educational attainment and working experience, reveal 
that since the late 1980s Spain has witnessed a considerable increase in the quality of 
its labour force thanks mainly to the replacement of workers reaching retirement age 
with a low level of educational attainment by younger, better trained generations (see 
Chart 4.8). There is a certain cyclical pattern to this improvement, which is more 
pronounced at times of larger job destruction, owing to such destruction being 
concentrated in temporary workers with lower levels of educational attainment and 
working experience. Conversely, during upturns, a large number of unemployed re-join 
the workforce. Given that, on average, the latter workers have lower productivity levels, 
partly owing to the loss of professional skills incurred during long periods of 
unemployment, their positive contribution in terms of the formation of the generational 
change in the workforce is lower, meaning that the aggregate index of quality of the 
labour factor grows to a lesser extent. 
Thus, to bring about a speedier improvement in the population’s cognitive and business 
skills, it would not suffice to act only on the educational system; it is also necessary to 
increase unemployed workers’ cognitive skills, to implement an effective continuous 
training system and to reduce the costs of professional business-support services. In this 
respect, it would be desirable in terms of business development to bring about a situation 
in which managers of the most productive new businesses may benefit from the knowledge 
imparted by business management professionals. As indicated in Chapter 1 of this Report, 
competition in the broad area of professional services is low in comparison with the OECD 
reference countries, which might be an indicator of difficulties of access by small firms to 
strategic consultancy services. 
The crisis has delayed the slow ongoing convergence of the Spanish economy’s stock of 
technological capital/GDP ratio relative to the euro area, which in 2014 was still 37% 
…whereby it is necessary to 
continue increasing human 
capital,…
…to promote investment in 
technological capital…
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España.
a See P. Cuadrado, A. Lacuesta and S. Puente (2008). The quality index approximates the productivity differences between workers with different observable 
characteristics (education, age, etc.).
b Productivity is calculated as the ratio between value added and employment. Until 1994 employment is expressed in terms of full-time equivalent employees 
and thereafter in terms of hours worked.
c Stock of technological capital calculated by the perpetual inventory method from the cumulative R&D expenditure expressed in current currency terms.
d The euro area aggregate relates to the 18 euro area countries in 2014. It therefore includes Spain, although Slovenia only since 1990, and Cyprus, Malta, 
Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia since 1995.
CHART 4.8IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPITAL IN SPAIN
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below the euro area average (see Chart 4.8). Throughout this chapter various factors, such 
as financing or insufficient managerial and employee skills, have been suggested as 
relevant factors for explaining this worse performance. However, there are many other 
reasons relating to the very structure of Spain’s public-private innovation system that 
should be reviewed in order to promote this type of investment (see the European 
Commission’s 2014 assessment report of the innovation system). 
It should be borne in mind that the generation and dissemination of innovation require a 
setting where the synergies between the main factors of production – namely physical and 
human capital, and business management capacity – are boosted.20 As the results offered 
in Table 4.3 suggest, access to financing and workers’ employment stability are associated 
with higher growth in productivity and unemployment. In this respect, positive effects of 
the existence of firm-level collective bargaining agreements have also been observed, 
insofar as they facilitate business management flexibility.21
Consequently, in order to promote business innovation, increase productivity growth and 
strengthen the Spanish economy’s productive structure, it is necessary to continue 
undertaking a series of complementary measures on several fronts. These include most 
notably, in view of the priority nature of the need to improve them, the regulation of 
competition in the market for goods and services, the availability and efficiency of business 
financing, and more extensive business flexibility that is compatible with an increase in 
workers’ employment stability. 
The evidence available shows that both business start-up-ups and failures in Spain appear 
to come about in a similar fashion to that observed in other countries, once the effects of 
the business cycle are taken into account. However, the worsening outlook for business 
profitability and the tightening of financing conditions further to the crisis are expected to 
have led, in recent years, to a situation in which the creation of new firms has held at 
relatively low levels. 
The characteristics of newly created Spanish firms are, in some respects, different from 
those of other countries, especially regarding size, initial level of productivity and survival 
rate, which appear to be lower than those of our peers. Nonetheless, in recent years the 
productivity of newly created firms relative to established companies has improved. It is 
further observed that productivity gains are a significant determinant of business growth, 
while greater size, in itself, need not result in improved productivity. 
The foregoing features give rise to a distribution of firms in Spain that is relatively skewed 
towards smaller-sized companies and to a negative productivity differential relative to 
European competitors with similar characteristics. This differential is across the board in 
terms of company size, although it is greater for smaller firms, in which segment newly 
created companies are concentrated.
…and to harness synergies 
encompassing business 
management, availability of 
financing and employment 
stability of workers
5 Conclusions
Business dynamics in Spain 
share some common features 
with our peer countries, 
although they also show some 
particularities…
20  L. Garicano and P. Heaton (2010), “Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: 
Evidence from Police Departments”, Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pp. 
167 201.
21  In this respect see L. Hospido and E. Moreno Galbis (2015), The Spanish Productivity Puzzle: in the Great 
Recession, Working Paper 1501, Banco de España; C. Guillamón, E. Moral Benito and S. Puente (2016), High 
growth in employment and productivity: Dynamic interactions, and the role of financial constraints, Working 
Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming, and A. Cabrales, J. J. Dolado and R. Mora (2013), “Dualidad laboral y 
déficit de formación ocupacional: evidencia sobre España con datos de PIAAC”, en PIAAC, volumen 2: Análisis 
secundario, Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte.
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The limited correlation between productivity and business growth in Spain may be caused 
by various different factors (economic, financial, institutional, regulatory, etc.). In any event, 
the various simulations and empirical analyses presented in this chapter show that a 
potential future elimination of the barriers restricting the efficient allocation of resources is 
not sufficient to ensure sustained increases in growth capacity. The latter will further 
require real business productivity boosts through improvements in the quality of production 
factors (workers’ human capital, business management and technological capital). 
…that highlight the need to 
alleviate frictions and 
inefficiencies in various areas 
and to foment real 
improvements in average 
business productivity levels 
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This box illustrates the channels through which business 
demography affects the dynamics of the main macroeconomic 
variables. To this end, various simulation exercises are performed 
using a general equilibrium model in which agents optimally 
decide to create a business, increase or decrease its size or 
liquidate its assets and discontinue production. In particular, in 
this model both starting a business and adjusting the scale of 
production are decisions taken by the entrepreneur requiring the 
outlay of a certain amount of non-recoverable funds. These entry 
and adjustment costs mean that new businesses start operations 
with below-average size and productivity, and only with time do 
they decide to increase both of these factors. The model intends, 
in turn, to realistically quantify the aggregate impact of changes in 
economic policy parameters that affect business decisions, as it is 
calibrated to reproduce both the aggregate ratios of the Spanish 
economy and the most relevant stylised facts of its business 
demography.
First, from a cyclical perspective, an economy’s response to 
different shocks is largely determined by business dynamics. 
These, in turn, depend on multiple factors, such as business 
start-up and growth costs, the frictions that affect the liquidation 
of assets, and the costs (fixed and variable) necessary to 
maintain different scales of production and levels of technology. 
To demonstrate their importance, the accompanying chart 
shows the impact of the most commonly analysed factor in the 
literature, namely business start-up costs. Specifically, it is 
shown that the lower the costs of starting a business, the 
greater the economy’s response to a temporary increase in the 
level of technology. In this case (the blue line in the chart), 
technological improvements make a larger number of business 
opportunities profitable and, as a result, more businesses are 
created. In turn, this increases the level of competition in the 
market, reduces business profits and enables greater increases 
in output.
BOX 4.1THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF BUSINESS DEMOGRAPHY
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Chart 1
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Responses of the model to a temporary increase in productivity with two different calibrations for business start-up costs. In the "low costs" scenario shown by the 
blue lines, business start-up costs are 50% lower than in the "high costs" scenario, which is shown by the red lines.
b Long-term changes or stationary state of the model in response to a permanent increase in the parameters listed in each column that is of a sufficient magnitude 
(also shown) to increase GDP by 1%. Thus, the first column shows the long-term effect of reducing business start-up costs by 6%; the second column shows 
the long-term effect of decreasing adjustment costs by 27%; and the third column shows the long-term effect of increasing the productivity of small business by 
0.3%.
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Second, the accompanying table shows the reaction of the main 
macroeconomic variables over the long term to changes in both 
entry and adjustment costs. The accompanying table compares 
the effect of changes to both parameters with the impact of 
technological improvements in small businesses. To provide for a 
comparison of the three scenarios, the exercises are calibrated so 
that the impact on GDP should be of the same magnitude (an 
increase of 1%). Thus, in the case of a reduction in entry costs (see 
the first column of the table), the fact that less investment is 
required to commence business operations increases the range of 
potentially profitable business opportunities, many of which 
ultimately result in new businesses being created in a shorter 
period of time. In turn, the larger number of businesses leads to an 
increase in employment and output, which enables workers to 
negotiate higher wages. The increase in disposable income enables 
agents to set aside more resources for consumption and investment 
and, therefore, to enjoy a higher level of well-being. However, it 
should be borne in mind that these aggregate effects are usually 
accompanied by relevant composition effects. More specifically, 
given that new businesses are mainly small, the increase in the 
number of businesses is concentrated in this group, which leads to 
a reduction in average productivity in the economy.1
A reduction in costs related to an increase in the scale of production 
(see the second column of the table) also leads to an increase in 
GDP over the long term. It is worth noting that achieving an 
increase in GDP of 1% would require a much larger reduction in 
adjustment costs (-27%) than in entry costs (-6%). Further, and 
unlike with the entry costs, when the reduction in costs is centred 
on those costs related to increasing the scale of production, the 
GDP increase is accompanied by a direct increase in aggregate 
productivity. Specifically, lower adjustment costs enable the 
growth of those small businesses pursuing projects with greater 
expected productivity, as it is now beneficial for them to invest in 
increasing their size and overall level of technology. In this way, the 
number of large businesses increases, as does their average 
productivity. The opposite occurs among small businesses, since 
their composition in terms of productivity is impaired. In turn, the 
higher probability of increasing in size boosts the expected 
profitability of setting up a new business, leading to an improvement 
in the flow of new businesses, although not as much as in the first 
scenario. Ultimately, it generates an increase in output, employment 
and consumption, which translates into substantial improvements 
in well-being over the long term.
Finally, these effects can be compared with those that would result 
from an increase in the average productivity of small businesses 
(see the final column of the table). As a result of this change, some 
small businesses will decide to invest and increase their size. 
Likewise, technological improvements boost business prospects 
for new entrants, leading to an increase in the number of 
businesses in the economy. In sum, these channels mean that a 
small increase of 0.3% in the TFP of small businesses (and 0.2% 
in the aggregate) generates a multiplier effect that leads to a 1% 
increase in GDP. In relative terms, even though it is difficult to 
compare the scales of the different economic policy tools, 
especially in terms of costs that do not have a real, quantifiable 
counterpart, this last measure seems to be particularly effective. 
Among the other measures considered, reducing entry costs gives 
rise to more appreciable effects on GDP and the level of 
competition, while reducing adjustment costs also leads to 
increased productivity.
BOX 4.1 THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF BUSINESS DEMOGRAPHY (cont’d)
1  The model is not designed in such a way that, given an increase in 
competition, the incentives increase for other businesses to differentiate 
themselves and thus invest in technology.
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In general, SMEs have greater difficulty accessing funding than 
larger companies, given the lower quality and quantity of the 
information available on their financial position (“information 
asymmetries”). These difficulties are even more severe for newly 
created businesses, since they have no credit history, and for 
those pursuing their activity in innovative fields with a more 
uncertain future. Moreover, as the recent economic and financial 
crisis has highlighted, these frictions are heightened during 
periods of uncertainty, when the assessment of risk profiles is 
more complicated.
In order to lessen the impact of these market failures, various 
schemes have been developed to provide public support for the 
funding of SMEs. As seen in Chart 1, there are various financial 
institutions in Spain, mostly public in nature, that support the 
financing of SMEs, whether through loans, capital contributions or 
guarantees.
In quantitative terms, the main support for SMEs is provided by 
the Official Credit Institute (ICO), which has financing programmes 
such as its so-called “líneas de mediación” (credit intermediation 
facilities), which are loans that are studied and granted by credit 
institutions, the role of the ICO being to provide liquidity.1 As seen 
in Table 1, during the last crisis these ICO facilities provided 
significant support for the financing of SMEs, although in 2015 the 
amount of new transactions fell considerably (to €9.7 billion), 
against a background of improvement in the financing conditions 
of credit institutions, following the launch of the Eurosystem’s 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations. In addition, the ICO 
also offers financial support through the purchasing of shares and 
equity loans by its venture capital funds, although in much smaller 
amounts than under the aforementioned facilities. Various regions 
(such as Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and the Basque Country) 
have public, financial or business institutions with objects and 
activities similar to those of the ICO, but the amounts of financing 
granted are more modest.
The Centre for Industrial Technological Development (CDTI) is a 
public enterprise, whose main activity consists in evaluating and 
BOX 4.2 FINANCIAL SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR SMES IN SPAIN
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The arrows denote the direction of financing, whether in the form of a loan, an acquisition of shares or a guarantee.
a Various regions have credit institutes to finance firms preferably located in their region[Institut Català de Finances (ICF), Institut Valencià de Finances (IVF), and 
Instituto de Crédito y Finanzas de la Región de Murcia (ICREF)].
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1  The insolvency risk of the operation is assumed by the private credit 
institution. Exceptionally, in 2010 and 2011 the ICO granted direct 
financing to SMEs and self-employed persons through the so-called 
ICO-Direct Programme, in this case assuming the whole of the credit risk.
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financing research projects, usually of SMEs, with a high technological 
content. The financial instruments normally used are loans,2 although 
it also provides capital to firms through various venture capital funds. 
As seen in Table 1, the CDTI agreed a total of €1 billion of direct new 
financing in 2015.
Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (COFIDES) and 
Empresa Nacional de Innovación, SA (ENISA), are two commercial 
companies, majority owned by the Spanish State (the former 
reporting to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness 
and the latter to the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism), 
whose objects are medium and long-term financing. In the case of 
COFIDES, the financing is targeted at investment projects executed 
abroad by Spanish firms (preferably through venture capital), while 
in that of ENISA, the financing is for projects of SMEs in which 
innovation is a strategic factor, and is mostly in the form of equity 
loans. The overall amount of financing provided through their 
various instruments is very moderate.
Mutual guarantee schemes (MGSs), which are financial institutions 
with mixed capital (provided by regional governments, credit 
BOX 4.2
 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR SMES IN SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCES: ICO, CDTI, COFIDES, CESCE, ENISA, CERSA, BME and Banco de España.
NOTE: "n. a." means data not available.
a Bank guarantees for "loans and other deferred payments".
b Amount reguaranteed.
c Credit risk insurance policies.
Amount
(€m)
No. of 
transactions
Amount
(€m)
No. of 
transactions
Amount
(€m)
No. of 
transactions
Amount
(€m)
No. of 
transactions
    ICO 11,555.1 162,090 13,940.8 190,175 21,485.3 298,814 9,876.5 166,010
        Loan 11,510.9 162,075 13,884.3 190,168 21,468.9 298,799 9,671.0 165,998
        Venture capital 44.2 15 56.5 7 16.4 15 205.5 12
    CDTI 1,082.1 689 837.1 1,303 858.1 1,400 1,020.5 1,402
        Loan 1,077.0 687 833.2 1,299 843.0 1,391 1,020.5 1,402
        Venture capital 5.1 2 3.9 4 15.1 9 n. d. n. d.
    COFIDES 227.4 44 221.6 57 244.9 56 n. d. n. d.
        Loan 31.0 27 36.6 31 29.1 27 n. d. n. d.
        Venture capital 196.4 17 185.0 26 215.8 29 n. d. n. d.
    ENISA 100.5 643 84.1 638 66.2 558 90.5 704
        Loan 98.4 637 83.3 636 65.9 556 90.3 700
        Venture capital 2.2 6 0.8 2 0.3 2 0.2 4
Guarntees and insurance
    SGR (a) 753.4 7,726 664.6 7,382 739.6 8,770 819.7 9,752
    CERSA (b) 298.7 n. a. 322.4 n. a. 353.5 n. a. n. a. n. a.
    CESCE (c) 164.9 n. a. 169.2 n. a. 151.3 n. a. n. a. n. a.
9.898,328.932,612.281,41LATOT
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Alternative markets
0.9654.8968.799.24stnemecalP
     MAB 42.9 13 47.8 15 129.0 17 78.5 11
     MARF – – 50.0 1 569.4 12 490.5 10
Crowdfunding platforms 0.5 2
5102410231022102
Loans and shares
Table 1
PROGRAMMES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SMEs. NEW TRANSACTIONS
2  Through so-called “research and development projects”.
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institutions and SMEs themselves), grant guarantees that cover, at 
least partially, the risks implicit in lending transactions.3 They have 
a marked regional and sectoral scope, and their activity is usually 
linked to a region. In 2015, they granted guarantees totalling €820 
million, a larger amount than in 2014 (€740 million). A significant 
part of the risk assumed by MGSs is usually transferred to 
Compañía Española de Reafianzamiento, SA (CERSA).
In insurance, Compañía Española de Seguros de Crédito a la 
Exportación (CESCE) also plays a role. The majority of the capital 
of this company is publicly owned and the main Spanish credit 
institutions and insurance companies also have holdings in it. 
Traditionally, its main activity as an insurance company has 
included managing export credit risk on behalf of the State. The 
volume of export credit insurance policies (premiums) has 
fluctuated between €150 million and €170 million in recent years.
In the European sphere, in January 2015, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the European  Investment Fund (EIF) launched a 
lending facility specifically aimed at SMEs and the self-employed 
for investment projects in Spain (“Iniciativa pyme-garantía FEI”), in 
which they assume 50% of the borrower’s credit risk (the rest 
being retained by the credit institution lender). The public 
contribution budgeted for this initiative was €800 million.
Finally, there are also mechanisms of public support for investment 
in newly created firms or those listed on an alternative market 
(such as the alternative stock market (MAB) or the alternative 
fixed-income market (MARF)) or, more recently, crowdfunding 
platforms,4 through personal income tax incentives and other 
measures.5 As seen in the lower part of Table 1, the financing 
obtained by firms through these channels has to date been limited 
(less than €600 million in 2015).
In short, there is a wide variety of – mainly public – institutions in 
Spain, offering support mechanisms for the financing of SMEs. 
Against a background of the need for fiscal consolidation, the 
amount of funds allocated to these programmes is necessarily 
limited. In this respect, it is especially relevant to carry out cost-
benefit analyses and to use the results obtained to optimise the 
use of the various instruments available, limiting their application 
to situations in which appreciable failures in the operation of the 
financial market do indeed occur. Also, a simplification of the 
current framework, characterised, as seen above, by a large 
number of institutions with similar objects, may be appropriate.
BOX 4.2 FINANCIAL SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR SMES IN SPAIN (cont’d)
3  From an operational standpoint, guarantees may be provided for 
different purposes. Thus, a guarantee may be provided for a bank loan 
or credit, but also to secure payment for domestic or foreign sales. A 
traditional operation consists in offering a guarantee to financial 
institutions which grant advances on the collection of export invoices.
4  Crowdfunding platforms were regulated in April 2015. They are a 
mechanism for channelling savings directly to productive investment, 
supplementing stock markets and banking systems. In particular, in 
October 2015, the CNMV (National Securities Market Commission) 
authorised the first (and so far only) equity crowdfunding, which is called 
Bolsa Social.
5  In the fiscal sphere, some regional governments and the State have 
introduced various incentives for the purchase of shares in newly 
created firms or in firms listed on alternative equity markets, provided 
that certain requirements are met regarding retention of the investment 
and the size of the firm. In the commercial sphere, in order to boost the 
MARF, regulatory changes have been made that affect both issuers of 
and investors in fixed-income securities. For the former, the limit on 
bond leveraging for public limited companies has been eliminated and, 
for investors, the regulations on private insurance and pension funds 
have been modified so that the acquisition of securities listed on this 
type of fixed-income market is apt for the coverage of technical 
provisions in the case of insurance.
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Insolvency proceedings, when well designed, can be an efficient 
mechanism for restructuring the debts of firms in financial 
difficulty. However, the insolvency system in Spain has traditionally 
been characterised by long and costly procedures,1 which result 
in the winding up of the firm in around 95% of cases.2 These 
weaknesses were highlighted by the sharp increase in insolvency 
proceedings during the crisis, which led to congestion in the 
mercantile courts.
In order to resolve these and other problems, the Insolvency Law 
was reformed on numerous occasions between 2009 and 2015.3 
As regards the insolvency of non-financial firms, among other 
changes, the scope of application of the faster and cheaper 
“shortened insolvency proceedings” has been extended, “early 
agreement proposals” have been promoted, the role of insolvency 
trustees has been reformed, refinancing agreements have been 
promoted as an alternative to insolvency proceedings, the legal 
regime for reorganisation agreements has been improved and the 
sale of the firm as a going  concern has been facilitated. In relation 
to individuals (consumers and self-employed persons), the “out-
of-court payment agreement”, a pre-insolvency mediation 
procedure, has been introduced, and a second chance mechanism 
has been created through which debtors may be discharged, under 
certain circumstances, from part of their outstanding debts.
This box presents an initial assessment of the effects of the four 
reforms to the legal framework for the insolvency of non-financial 
firms.4 The reforms that affect the bankruptcy of individuals are not 
assessed as the information needed to do this is not available. The 
analysis presented below is based on insolvency data from the 
Mercantile Registers that is received by the Banco de España’s 
Central Balance Sheet Data Office, and information on the balance 
sheets of insolvent firms obtained from the same source. The 
methodology used is the estimation of duration models and linear 
probability models,5 using daily information on dates of approval 
of reorganisation agreements, commencement of liquidation and 
termination of insolvency proceedings to estimate the impact of 
the reforms over short time frames (three months) before and after 
the entry into force of the reforms. At the same time, in order to 
taken into account the effect of other factors on the probability of 
approval of a reorganisation agreement and the duration of 
insolvency proceedings, a number of characteristics of insolvent 
firms are included (size, age, profitability, indebtedness, sector, 
etc.), as well as some for the province in which their registered 
office is situated (unemployment rate and insolvency rate).
The results, summarised in Table 1, show that some of the reforms 
analysed may have had a notable impact on the probability of 
reaching a reorganisation agreement and on the duration of 
insolvency proceedings. In particular, the 2012 reform6 appears to 
have increased the probability of a reorganisation agreement by at 
least five percentage points (see column 1), a significant impact 
BOX 4.3 AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT REFORMS TO INSOLVENCY LAW
1  E. Van Hemmen (2007 2014), Estadística concursal. Anuario 2006. 
Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mercantiles de España, 
Madrid (and subsequent editions), and Consejo General del Poder 
Judicial (2007-2015), La justicia dato a dato: año 2014 (and subsequent 
editions).
2  M. Celentani, M. García Posada and F. Gómez (2010), The Spanish 
Business Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis, FEDEA Working Paper 2010-
11. Banco de España (2014), 2013 Annual Report.
3  The Insolvency Law passed in 2003 has been amended on numerous 
occasions as a result of the crisis. Specifically, amendments have been 
made by Royal Decree-Law 3/2009, Law 38/2011, Law 14/2013, Royal 
Decree-Law 4/2014, Royal Decree-Law 11/2014, Law 9/2015 and Law 
25/2015.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: *, **, *** denote a correlation coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
a Results based on a linear probability model using 678 insolvencies declared between 1 October 2011 and 1 April 2012. The estimates include, as control variables, 
the age of the firm and the number of employees (both in logarithms), the ROA, tangible fixed assets as a percentage of total assets, the debt ratio (relative to 
assets), the liquidity ratio (current liabilities to current assets), the interest coverage ratio, the unemployment rate and the insolvency rate (number of insolvencies 
as a percentage of the total number of firms) of the province of the firm's registered office, 17 sectoral dummy variables and 17 provincial dummy variables.
b Results based on a log-logistic duration model estimated by maximum likelihood using 519 insolvencies declared between 8 December 2013 and 8 June 2014. 
The estimates include the control variables mentioned in note a) and a dummy variable for "express insolvencies" (insolvency proceedings that are dismissed as 
the assets are not sufficient to cover the costs of the process).
321
)b( noitaruD)a( tnemeerga .borP)a( tnemeerga .borPelbairav tnednepeD
***503,21**901,5mrofer 2102
***612,0-stessa dexif elbignaT * mrofer 2102
March 2014 reform -17,4**
Table 1
MARGINAL IMPACT (%) ON THE PROBABILITY OF REACHING A REORGANISATION AGREEMENT AND ON THE DURATION OF INSOLVENCY 
4  See M. García Posada and R. Vegas (2016, Las reformas de la Ley 
Concursal durante la Gran Recesión, Documentos de Trabajo, Banco de 
España, forthcoming.
5  Very similar results were obtained when probit models were used to 
analyse robustness.
6  Law 38/2011 of 10 October 2011 reforming Insolvency Law 22/2003 of 
9 July 2003. Most of the reforms entered into force on 1 January 2012, 
while those that did not entered into force on the day following 
publication of the Law in the Official State Gazette (BOE) on 11 October 
2011.
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considering that only 9% of the firms in the sample obtained 
reorganisation agreements.7 This suggests that, thanks to the 
reform, a larger proportion of firms benefited from a restructuring 
of their debt, without being wound up and having their assets sold 
off, which may in many cases be a sub-optimal option. Moreover, 
this impact on the probability of a reorganisation agreement 
appears to have been greater for firms with a lower liquidation 
value (approximated by the proportion of their total assets that are 
tangible fixed assets; see column 2), which suggests an increase 
in ex-post efficiency; i.e. in the probability of restructuring firms 
whose value as a going concern is greater than their liquidation 
value and of liquidating those for which the opposite is the case.
These effects may be a result of the changes to the appointment and 
composition of insolvency trustees effected by the 2012 reform. 
Previously, the general rule was that there were three trustees (a 
lawyer; an auditor, economist or commercial graduate, and an 
unsecured creditor), all of whom were appointed by the judge 
hearing the insolvency proceedings. Following the reform, there is 
generally only one single trustee (except in very complex insolvencies, 
when a large unsecured creditor is appointed as a second trustee). 
This may have reduced problems of coordination (e.g. conflicts 
between trustees) and has probably involved cost savings, factors 
that would be conducive to the reaching of a reorganisation 
agreement. In addition, the reform sought to increase the 
professionalism of insolvency trustees, which may have increased 
the capacity to distinguish between viable and non-viable firms. 
Thus, the requirements to become a trustee, relating to experience 
and specific training, were tightened and legal persons that have at 
least one practising lawyer and one auditor, economist or commercial 
graduate on their staff (e.g. consultancies) can be appointed as 
insolvency trustees.
The results obtained also indicate that the March 2014 reform has 
substantially reduced the duration of insolvency proceedings.8 
Specifically, their average duration was reduced by at least 17% 
(see column 3). This may be due to the fact that the reform improved 
certain aspects of the legal framework for refinancing agreements 
(the so-called “preconcurso de acreedores”). Although the number 
of firms that reach refinancing agreements with their creditors is 
very small (between 100 and 200 per annum), they are much larger 
than the majority of those entering insolvency proceedings; for 
example, in 2013, the average assets of those that obtained a 
refinancing agreement were €117 million, while the average assets 
of firms subject to insolvency proceedings were €6 million.9 This 
suggests that, by increasing refinancing agreements as an 
alternative to insolvency, the March 2014 reform may have freed up 
mercantile court resources, reducing their congestion and, 
therefore, the duration of insolvency proceedings.
BOX 4.3 AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT REFORMS TO INSOLVENCY LAW (cont’d)
7  This percentage is in line with the literature. For example, E. Van 
Hemmen (2014), “La sociología de la liquidación concursal en la realidad 
española”, in La liquidación de la masa activa, edited by Á. J. Rojo 
Fernández Río, J. Quijano González and A. B. Campuzano, Aranzadi-
Thomson Reuters, finds that 5-10% of the firms in the sample reached a 
reorganisation agreement during the period 2006 2012.
8  Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 4/2014 of 7 March 2014 adopting urgent 
measures on corporate debt refinancing and restructuring, which 
entered into force on 8 March 2014.
9  E. Van Hemmen (2014), “La sociología de la liquidación concursal en la 
realidad Española”, in La liquidación de la masa activa, edited by Á. J. 
Rojo Fernández Río, J. Quijano González and A. B. Campuzano, 
Aranzadi Thomson Reuters.

